Seventh Circuit Review
Volume 4

Issue 1

Article 4

9-1-2008

Let's Get It Straight: The Effect of Fehribach, The HA2003
Liquidating Trust, and Joyce on a Debtor's Pre-Bankruptcy
Professionals and Where to Go From Here
Jamie L. Johnson
IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jamie L. Johnson, Let's Get It Straight: The Effect of Fehribach, The HA2003 Liquidating Trust, and Joyce
on a Debtor's Pre-Bankruptcy Professionals and Where to Go From Here, 4 Seventh Circuit Rev. 59 (2008).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol4/iss1/4

This Bankruptcy is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Seventh Circuit Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @
IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

Johnson: Let's Get It Straight: The Effect of <em>Fehribach</em>, <em>The

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 4, Issue 1

Fall 2008

LET’S GET IT STRAIGHT: THE EFFECT OF
FEHRIBACH, THE HA2003 LIQUIDATING TRUST,
AND JOYCE ON A DEBTOR’S PRE-BANKRUPTCY
PROFESSIONALS AND WHERE TO GO FROM
HERE
JAMIE L. JOHNSON ∗
Cite as: Jamie L. Johnson, Let’s Get It Straight: The Effect of Fehribach, The
HA2003 Liquidating Trust, and Joyce on a Debtor’s Pre-Bankruptcy Professionals
and Where to Go From Here, 4 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 59 (2008), at
http://www.kentlaw.edu/7cr/v4-1/johnson.pdf.

INTRODUCTION
Many times when a business files for bankruptcy under the United
States Bankruptcy Code no assets remain for the debtor’s general
unsecured creditors. 1 This lack of assets leaves the pre-bankruptcy
creditors scrambling to find someone to compensate them for their
resulting losses. 2 Who might that someone be? Not the debtor’s
professionals, according to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit. 3

∗ J.D. candidate, May 2009, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; Eastern Illinois University, magna cum laude, B.A., May 2006.
1
See Steve Jakubowski, 7th Circuit Nixes Attempts to Hold Investment Bankers
Responsible for Matters Beyond Their Engagement Agreements, BANKRUPTCY
LITIGATION BLOG, Aug. 25, 2008,
http://www.bankruptcylitigationblog.com/archives/cat-litigation-lore. See generally
Bankruptcy Code 11 U.S.C. §§ 1001-9036 (2006).
2
See Jakubowski supra note 1.
3
See e.g., Fehribach v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 493 F.3d 905 (7th Cir. 2007)
(Rovner, I., concurring); HA2003 Liquidating Trust v. Credit Suisse Securities
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Businesses have the option of outsourcing their accounting or
financial advising needs to specialized firms, rather than conduct these
services in-house. 4 This Article refers to these firms as the debtor’s
professionals. After filing for bankruptcy, there is no longer a need for
these professionals as the bankrupt business is liquidated. 5 This
liquidation may occur in either a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding—
where the main goal is not to save the dying company but rather to
liquidate its remaining assets and close its doors for good—or in a
Chapter 11 proceeding—where the plan of reorganization may provide
for liquidation. 6 Although the bankrupt company’s pre-bankruptcy
professionals are no longer employed by the debtor business, all ties
between the two may not be completely severed. The trustee,
stockholders, or other interested parties may try to recover from these
professionals based on their alleged contribution to the business’s
demise—which is similar to what occurred in three cases recently
decided by the Seventh Circuit. 7
In Fehribach v. Ernst & Young, LLP, the court held that the
debtor’s accounting firm was not negligent in failing to include a
going-concern qualification in its audit report.8 Similarly, in The
HA2003 Liquidating Trust v. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, the
court stated that the debtor’s investment banker was not grossly
negligent in issuing a fairness opinion that used unsound financial
projections. 9 Finally, in Joyce v. Morgan Stanley & Co., the Seventh
(USA), LLC, 517 F.3d 454 (7th Cir. 2008); Joyce v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 538
F.3d 797 (7th Cir. 2008).
4
See generally, Brad L. Peterson, When and Why Companies Outsource and
Offshore, in, OUTSOURCING AND OFFSHORING 2008 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks, & Literary Property, Course Handbook Series Order No. 14714,
2008)(discussing the general advantages and disadvantages of outsourcing).
5
See generally, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE
LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 369 (5th ed. 2006) (describing the general
purpose behind liquidation).
6
Id. at 369, 395.
7
Fehribach, 493 F.3d at 908; HA2003 Liquidating Trust, 517 F.3d at 456;
Joyce, 538 F.3d at 799.
8
493F.3d at 909-10.
9
517 F.3d at 457.
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Circuit rejected the stockholders’ attempt to hold the business’s
financial advisor liable based on a fairness opinion issued in
connection with the business’s proposed merger. 10
The Seventh Circuit is not the only circuit court to consider the
question of whether these third party professionals can be held liable,
and if so under what causes of action. Other courts, in addition to the
Seventh Circuit, have dealt with cases brought against these
professionals under a variety of causes of action, all of which come
with their own potential weaknesses. 11 The causes of action that will
be discussed in greater length throughout this Article are deepening
insolvency and standard tort theories such as negligence and
constructive fraud. While all of the above theories of liability—along
with claims for breach of contract—were rejected in Fehribach, The
HA2003 Liquidating Trust, and Joyce, other Circuits have taken
differing views, both in considering the controversial theory of
deepening insolvency and in determining whether there should be a
privity requirement attached to a third party’s ability to bring a tort
claim against an outside professional. 12
Part I of this Article presents a brief background of what a
bankruptcy filed under either Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code entails, which is provided to explain why a trustee
may feel the need to file suit against these pre-bankruptcy
professionals. Part II of this Article examines how these professionals
have fared in other circuits and lower federal courts by considering the
various causes of action they have been sued under—specifically,
deepening insolvency and causes of action under standard tort law.
Part III of this Article provides a detailed background of Fehribach,
The HA2003 Liquidating Trust, and Joyce and also examines the
10

538 F.3d at 802. Although Joyce was not initiated in connection with a
bankruptcy proceeding, the issues decided by the court, in the author’s opinion are
both similar to and will have a direct impact on the potential for liability of a
debtor’s pre-bankruptcy professionals. Thus, Joyce will be discussed throughout this
Article as if the losses suffered by the stockholders are equivalent to the losses
suffered through bankruptcy in Fehribach and HA2003 Liquidating Trust.
11
See infra note 36, 57 and accompanying text.
12
See e.g. infra note 44, 46, 52, 62 and accompanying text.
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Seventh Circuit’s reasoning and holdings in each of those cases.
Finally, Part IV concludes that the Seventh Circuit’s unwillingness to
hold a third-party professional liable for the mistakes of management
in the aforementioned cases is a step in the right direction. However,
an analytical framework for analyzing claims against these
professionals is necessary, and Part IV of this Article proposes that the
framework used should be analogous to the law as it pertains to
lenders in the context of equitable subordination, under which, these
professionals would only be held liable under strict circumstances but
would not escape liability under all circumstances.
I. COMMERCIAL BANKRUPTCY UNDER THE CODE: A GENERAL
OVERVIEW
A. Chapter 7 Liquidation
Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code is what is known
as “primal bankruptcy” because it reflects the most basic purpose of
bankruptcy law as a response to a defaulting business. 13 A corporation
that enters a Chapter 7 proceeding will see all of its assets liquidated
before it expires under state corporate law. 14 This is in stark contrast to
a case filed under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, where the
intention is to reorganize the struggling corporation so that it may
hopefully emerge from the bankruptcy both leaner and with a reduced
debt burden. 15
A corporation may find itself in a Chapter 7 proceeding either
voluntarily or involuntarily. 16 A business may choose to voluntarily
file a Chapter 7 petition, enabling it to liquidate its assets in an orderly

13

ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS
AND CREDITORS 372 (5th ed. 2006).
14

Id. at 369.
Id. A plan of reorganization in a Chapter 11 proceeding can, however,
provide for the liquidation of the debtor’s assets. Id. at 395.
16
Id. at 374-75.
15
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fashion because the automatic stay will take effect. 17 However,
because of the drastic consequences of filing a Chapter 7 petition,
many businesses wait until the last possible moment to file—all too
often when the value of the company has already been depleted
beyond saving. 18 A business may also find itself in a Chapter 7
proceeding against its will if an involuntary petition is filed by its
creditors. 19 Involuntary petitions are rare and section 303 of the
Bankruptcy Code makes them relatively difficult to file by including
various requirements such as the three-creditor rule—which requires
that at least three creditors join in the involuntary petition. 20
Once a petition is filed a trustee in bankruptcy is appointed to
liquidate and administer the assets of the bankruptcy estate. 21 Many
Chapter 7 proceedings, however, are considered “no-asset”
bankruptcies—meaning there is simply nothing left for the trustee to
administer. 22 This lack of assets may lead the trustee to file an action
against the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy professionals in an attempt to
17

Id. at 373. The automatic stay is a legal mandate which acts as a freeze on
any and all attempts to collect a debt from the debtor and all civil litigation involving
the rights of the debtor. Katelyn Knight, Comment, Equitable Mootness in
Bankruptcy Appeals, 49 Santa Clara L. Rev. 253, 260-61 (2009). See also 11 U.S.C.
§ 362 (2006).
18
WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 14, at 375.
19
Id.; See also 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2006).
20
WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 14, at 375.
21
Id. at 134. A trustee in bankruptcy is appointed by the U.S. Trustee, elected
by creditors, or appointed by a judge to administer a bankruptcy estate. BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). The bankruptcy estate is created with the
commencement of a bankruptcy case and constitutes a legal entity separate from the
debtor. The property which makes up the bankruptcy estate is protected by the
automatic stay from claims of creditors and is subject to the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court. Steve H. Federstein, Property of the Estate, in, UNDERSTANDING
THE BASICS OF BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY AND REORGANIZATION 2008, at 117 (PLI
Comm. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series Order No. 14425, 2008)
(Updating Author). See also 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2006).
22
Lucian Arye Bebchuck & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority
of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L. J. 857, 886 n. 107 (1996)
(acknowledging that in the United States general unsecured creditors will receive
nothing in bankruptcy eighty percent of the time and four-five cents on the dollar
twenty percent of the time).
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collect more money for the estate—which, in turn, means more money
for creditors. 23
B. Chapter 11 Reorganization
The central focus of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy is the reorganization
of the struggling debtor. 24 Such reorganization can include, for
example, only paying back a certain percentage of bank loans or
extending the amount of time a debtor has to pay back those loans
under its previous agreements. 25 Ultimately, however, a number of
large debtor corporations liquidate through Chapter 11 by creating a
plan of liquidation when a plan of reorganization is not feasible. 26 A
Chapter 11 case may also be converted to a Chapter 7 to effectuate a
liquidation. 27
As with a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding, a Chapter 11
proceeding may also be commenced by either the filing of a voluntary
or involuntary petition. 28 Creditors may believe it’s necessary to put a
business in a Chapter 11 proceeding to obtain important financial
information or allow for the supervision of the debtor without forcing
it to close its doors. 29 The same requirements exist under section 303
of the Bankruptcy Code for creditors attempting to push a business
into a Chapter 11 proceeding as they do for Chapter 7 involuntary
bankruptcies. 30
Once a case is commenced under Chapter 11, if no trustee is
appointed, the debtor becomes a new legal entity known as the “debtor
in possession.” 31 The debtor-in-possession is equivalent to the trustee

23

See Fehribach v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 493 F.3d 905, 907 (7th Cir. 2007)
(Rovner, J., concurring).
24
WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 14, at 395.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 412.
28
Id. at 377.
29
Id.
30
Id. See also 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2006).
31
WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 14, at 409.
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in a Chapter 7 proceeding in terms of most of its powers and
obligations in the bankruptcy. 32
The main goal of the debtor in possession is to formulate a
feasible plan of reorganization. 33 A plan of reorganization can be
confirmed by the bankruptcy court even though the plan’s terms do not
provide for a distribution to general unsecured creditors, which
explains why these creditors would want to bring an action against the
debtor’s pre-bankruptcy professionals—because bringing suit against
those professionals may be the only way to find a deep-pocket to
enable them to recover on their claims. 34
II. POTENTIAL CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST THIRD PARTY
PROFESSIONALS AND THEIR VARYING TREATMENT IN THE COURTS
THROUGHOUT HISTORY
As is true in the Seventh Circuit, the law pertaining to whether a
debtor’s professionals can be held liable for a company’s plunge into
bankruptcy varies depending on which cause of action the creditors
utilize to make their case. Deepening insolvency, for example, is
controversial by nature and has been treated as an independent tort, a
theory of damages, or rejected completely depending on which court
the theory is presented to. 35 For other more standard tort theories—
such as negligence and fraud—the difference between the courts
centers on the question of whether privity is a prerequisite to the

32

11 U.S.C. § 1107 (2006).
WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 14, at 609.
34
See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2006) (providing the requirements for confirmation of
a plan of reorganization).
35
See generally Diane F. Coffino & Charles H. Jeanfreau, Delaware Hits the
Brakes: The Effect of Gheewalla and Trenwick on Creditor Claims, 17 J. BANKR. L.
& PRAC. 1 ART. 3 (2008) (examining the rejection of deepening insolvency as an
independent tort and its contentious existence as a damages theory); Sara E. Apel,
Comment, In Too Deep: Why the Federal Courts Should Not Recognize Deepening
Insolvency as a Cause of Action, 24 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 85, 99-112 (2008)
(discussing the current state of the law regarding deepening insolvency).
33

65

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2008

7

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 4

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 4, Issue 1

Fall 2008

assertion of a claim by a third party against an outside professional,
which is determined by looking at the state law governing the action. 36
A. Deepening Insolvency: Cause of Action or Damages Theory?
The theory of deepening insolvency argues that directors, officers,
corporate affiliates, lenders, and third party advisors should be held
liable to the corporation (for its creditors’ benefits) for their
participation in deciding to continue operating financially distressed
companies through borrowing rather than immediately recommending
liquidation. 37 In 2001, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit was the first court to recognize deepening insolvency as an
independent tort in Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F.
Lafferty & Co. 38 In upholding the district court’s refusal to grant the
outside advisor’s motion to dismiss, the court stated that it believed the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would recognize deepening insolvency
as a cause of action because the theory was becoming more
universally accepted. 39 The Third Circuit also reasoned that under
Pennsylvania common law principles “where there is an injury, the
law provides a remedy.” 40 However, in rationalizing its creation of the
new tort, the Lafferty court failed to cite to any specific state law on
the subject. 41
Not all courts, however, have recognized the concept of
deepening insolvency as an independent tort. 42 The theory was first
36

John Michael Klamann & Bert Stephen Braud, Third Party Accountant
Liability—Prospective Financial Statements Used in Securities Offerings, 45 AM.
JUR. TRIALS 113, §38 (2008).
37
Coffino & Jeanfreau, supra note 35.
38
267 F.3d 340 (3rd Cir. 2001); See also Coffino & Jeanfreau, supra note 35;
Apel, supra note 35, at 95.
39
Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 352; See also Coffino & Jeanfreau, supra note 35;
Apel, supra note 35, at 95-96.
40
Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 351; See also Coffino & Jeanfreau, supra note 35.
41
Apel, supra note 35, at 96.
42
See Coffino & Jeanfreau, supra note 36; Russell C. Silberglied, Keep Your
Deepening Insolvency Materials: Harmonizing Brown Schools with Radnor
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used by the courts as a theory of damages, and while some courts
rejected deepening insolvency as a cause of action, they continued to
use it to form a measure of damages caused by either breach of duty or
another tort. 43 The idea of deepening insolvency as a damages theory
originated in the Seventh Circuit in Schacht v. Brown, where the court
rejected the proposition that a corporation could never sue to recover
damages sustained through the prolongation of an insolvent
corporation’s life. 44
The Third Circuit, however, seemed to reject deepening
insolvency as a damages theory and also backtracked on its Lafferty
decision in In re CitX Corp. 45 In CitX, the court considered whether
the plaintiff could ask for damages based on deepening insolvency in
conjunction with his underlying malpractice claim. 46 The court noted
that causation for deepening insolvency damages was difficult to
prove—and was not proven by the plaintiff—and therefore, would be
unlikely to be a preferred method of calculating damages. 47 The CitX
court also attempted to narrow its previous holding in Lafferty—that
deepening insolvency could stand as an independent cause of action—
by stating that the cause of action requires a pleading of fraud. 48 By
Holdings and Post-CitX Case Law: Part I, 27-SEP AM. BANKR. INST. J. 26, 61
(2008).
43
See e.g., Coffino & Jeanfreau, supra note 35, n. 65; In re Greater Southeast
Community Hospital Corp. I, 353 B.R. 324, 338 (Bankr. D. D.C. 2006) (deepening
insolvency was treated as it was meant to be—a theory of harm); In re Southwest
Florida Heart Group P.A., 346 B.R. 897, 898 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006) (deepening
insolvency claim was only relevant to measure of damages and was not a cause of
action standing alone); In re Flagship Healthcare, Inc., 269 B.R. 721, 728 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 2001) (deepening insolvency may be used in negligence action as a
measure of damages).
44
711 F.2d 1343, 1350 (7th Cir. 1983). See also Apel, supra note 35, at 88.
45
Seitz v. Detweiler, Hershey & Assocs., P.C. (In re CitX Corp.), 448 F.3d
672 (3d Cir. 2006). See also Silberglied, supra note 42, at 61 (CitX limited the
principle that even if deepening insolvency was not an independent tort, it could be
viewed as a damages theory).
46
CitX, 448 F.3d at 674.
47
Id. at 678; See also Apel, supra note 35, at 101-02.
48
CitX, 448 F.3d at 680-81. See also Apel, supra note 35, at 102.
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deeming fraud as a necessary component of a deepening insolvency
claim, the Third Circuit highlighted the major flaw of the theory—
deepening insolvency simply duplicates other existing causes of
action. 49
The Third Circuit’s decisions in Lafferty and CitX have been
interpreted narrowly by some federal courts in their support for
deepening insolvency as either a cause of action or a damages
theory. 50 The history of the theory, however, illustrates its
controversial nature, and some federal courts have chosen to reject
deepening insolvency altogether—whether pleaded as an independent
tort or a damages theory. 51 Courts choosing to reject the theory have
primarily relied on four grounds to do so: (1) the absence of state law
supporting the theory, (2) the business judgment rule, (3) a lack of
standing, and (4) in pari delicto as an affirmative defense. 52
Although there is a trend toward complete rejection of the theory
of deepening insolvency, the precedent laid down in Lafferty continues
to create confusion among federal courts. 53 This is especially true
because the Lafferty decision itself, while recognizing deepening
49

Coffino& Jeanfreau, supra note 35.
Apel, supra note 35, at 113-14. Much of the litigation over whether
deepening insolvency is a cause of action, damages theory, or neither has taken place
in the Third Circuit. Richard I. Aaron, An Overview of Bankruptcy Choices Under
Chapter 7, Chapter 11, Chapter 12, and Chapter 13, 1 BKRFUND §1.7, n. 1.10
(2008).
51
See In re Global Serv. Group, 316 B.R. 451 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004). But see
In re Del-Met Corp., 322 B.R. 781 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2005).
52
Apel, supra note 35, at 99-100. The business judgment rule is the
presumption that officers and directors of a company make their business decisions
on an informed good faith basis while acting with an honest belief that they are
doing what is best for their company. Under the business judgment rule,
disinterested directors will not be subjected to liability for decisions that were proven
unwise. D.J. (Jan) Baker, John Wm. (Jack) Butler, Jr., & Mark A. McDermott,
Corporate Governance of Troubled Companies and the Role of Restructuring
Counsel, 63 BUS. LAW. 855, 857 (2008). In pari delicto means “equal fault” and, as
such, is the basis for a court’s denial of relief. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed.
2004).
53
Apel, supra note 35, at 112.
50
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insolvency as a cause of action, failed to set forth the actual elements
of the claim. 54 Therefore, a difference exists in what the tort of
deepening insolvency actually entails even among courts recognizing
the cause of action. 55 Unfortunately, sorting through the muddled law
relating to deepening insolvency does little to add clarity to exactly
when a third party professional can be held liable for the tort or the
resulting damages based on an underlying cause of action.
B. Standard Tort Theories: Privity Problems
In a state that completely rejects the theory of deepening
insolvency, there are usually a number of other causes of action a
creditor may attempt to hold the third party professional liable under. 56
Standard common law tort theories such as negligence and fraud are
common causes of action for creditors seeking to hold an advisor or
accountant liable for their losses stemming from a corporation’s
liquidation. 57 Historically, however, Justice Cardozo’s seminal
decision in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche made it more difficult to hold
outsiders who were not in privity with the plaintiff liable under a
negligence theory. 58 In Ultramares, the action for misrepresentation
(both negligent and fraudulent) was brought against a third party
accounting firm to recover a loss the plaintiffs allegedly suffered as a
result of reliance on an audit prepared by that firm. 59 The court,
however, refused to find that the law should admit “to liability in an

54

Id. at 113.
Id.
56
See generally Klamann & Braud, supra note 37 (specifying the various
potential causes of actions or theories a third party accountant can be held liable
under).
57
See Id. at §38. While creditors also tend to file breach of contract actions
against third party professionals, those actions will not be discussed in this section
but will rather only be discussed in the context of the Seventh Circuit’s decisions in
Fehribach, The HA2003 Liquidating Trust, and Joyce.
58
174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931); Klamann & Braud, supra note 37, at §38.
59
174 N.E. at 442.
55
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indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate
class” and thus held that the accounting firm was not liable.60
Many courts disfavor Ultramares, however, and stemming from
that disfavor a number of varying positions have arisen concerning
whether a professional can be held liable to a third party under tort
theories. 61
A number of courts have rejected what is known as the strict
privity rule espoused in Ultramares and have instead taken the
position advocated by the Restatement (2d) of Torts §552. 62 The
Restatement’s view has been embraced by as many as nineteen states,
and is now considered the majority view. 63 This view provides that a
third party to a contract can recover for losses suffered as a result of
misinformation if that third party is part of a narrow group that the
misinformer knows its client will channel the information to as part of
a particular business transaction or a substantially similar business
transaction. 64
60

Id. at 444.
Klamann & Braud, supra note 37, at §38.
62
Bovee v. Coopers & Lybrand C.P.A., 272 F.3d 356, 363 (6th Cir. 2001);
Barrie v. V.P. Exterminators, Inc., 625 So.2d 1007, 1012 (La. 1993).
63
Barrie, 625 So.2d at 1013.
64
Id. at 1014. Section 552 of the Restatement (2d) of Torts provides:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession, or
employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a
pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of
others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for
pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the
information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence
in obtaining or communicating the information. (2) Except as
stated in Subsection (3), the liability in Subsection (1) is limited to
loss suffered (a) by the person or one or more of a limited group of
persons for whose benefit and guidance he intends to supply the
information or knows that the recipient intends to supply it; and (b)
through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the
information to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or
in a substantially similar transaction. (3) The liability of one who is
under a public duty to give the information extends to the loss
suffered by any of the class of persons for whose benefit the duty
61
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In contrast, the minority view is referred to the “akin to privity”
view. 65 Courts using this restrictive view extend liability for economic
loss only if the defendant is in a relationship with the plaintiff that is
deemed “akin to privity.” 66 This rule stemmed from the Ultramares
decision and a modification of that rule in Credit Alliance Corp. v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., requiring “linking conduct” on the
defendant’s part. 67 The scope of the defendant’s duty as defined by the
“akin to privity” rule depends on both the defendant’s state of mind
and the parties’ mutual expectations in the underlying contract. 68 The
minority rule differs from the majority rule in that it requires the
precise identity of the third party to be foreseen by the defendants,
while the majority view only requires that a narrow group—not the
precise membership of that group—be foreseen by the defendants. 69
Lastly, courts willing to take an expansive view on the privity
question adhere to the foreseeability rule when determining potential
professional liability to third parties. Under this rule, third parties can
recover “to the extent that damages incurred by non-clients are
reasonably foreseeable.” 70 Therefore, liability can be extended to all
reasonably foreseeable plaintiffs who suffered an economic loss based
on an actual and justifiable reliance on a negligent misrepresentation;
thereby doing away with the notion of privity altogether. At least three
courts follow the foreseeability view in determining potential liability
for professionals to third party plaintiffs. 71

is created, in any of the transactions in which it is intended to
protect them. Restatement (Second) of Torts §552 (1977).
65
Barrie, 625 So. 2d at 1013.
66
Id.
67
Id. See 483 N.E.2d 110 (1985).
68
Barrie, 625 So.2d at 1013.
69
Id. at 1014.
70
Id. at 1013.
71
Id.
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III. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S TAKE ON PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY AS SET
FORTH IN ITS RECENT DECISIONS
A. Fehribach v. Ernst & Young
Fehribach v. Ernst & Young LLP was initiated with the filing of an
adversary complaint by the trustee in bankruptcy against the debtor’s
accounting firm. 72 The complaint alleged causes of action for both
negligence and breach of contract for the accounting firm’s failure to
include a going-concern qualification in the audit report the firm had
prepared for the debtor, Taurus Foods, Inc. 73 Taurus Foods was a
small distributor of frozen meats and other foods before it was forced
into an involuntary bankruptcy by three of its creditors. 74 In October
of 1995, Ernst & Young, acting in its capacity as auditor for Taurus
Foods, prepared an audit report for Taurus’s 1995 fiscal year, which
ran from January 1994 through January 1995. 75 In that report, Ernst &
Young indicated that there was no “substantial doubt” that Taurus’s
business was capable of continuing as a going concern until at least
January of 1996. 76
In May of 1996, Taurus’s principal banker, Bank One, became
alarmed at the company’s financial condition and transferred the
account to an office specializing in risky loans. 77 After the account
was transferred, the new office began imposing greater restrictions on
Taurus, and its financial deterioration continued at an increased pace. 78
72

493 F.3d 905 (7th Cir. 2007) (Rovner, J., concurring). Adversary
proceedings are subactions of a bankruptcy case that arise within the bankruptcy
case. Joseph J. Bassano, et.al., Fundamentals of Bankruptcy Practice, 9 AM. JUR. 2D
BANKRUPTCY §87 (2008).
73
Fehribach, 493 F.3d at 907. Going concern is defined as “a commercial
enterprise actively engaging in business with the expectation of indefinite
continuance.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
74
Fehribach, 493 F.3d at 907.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 907-08
77
Id. at 908.
78
Id.
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In an effort to rescue the company from its demise, the Chief Financial
Officer began to defraud Bank One by inflating the company’s sales
and accounts receivable in the daily reports Taurus was required to
present to the bank. 79 Shortly after the fraud was exposed, Taurus was
pushed into a Chapter 7 liquidation. 80
In filing its complaint against Ernst & Young, the trustee alleged
that the auditor was negligent in failing to include a going-concern
qualification in the audit report for the 1995 fiscal year. 81 Using expert
evidence, the trustee argued that had the going-concern qualification
been included in the report, the owners of the company (who also
acted as the managers) would have realized the company could not
survive and would have immediately liquidated. 82 An earlier
liquidation, the trustee claimed, would have avoided the cost of
operating under Bank One’s restrictions—to the tune of $3 million
dollars. 83 Ernst & Young moved for summary judgment in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, which was
granted on its behalf. 84 The trustee then appealed to the Seventh
Circuit. 85
Judge Richard A. Posner wrote the court’s opinion in Fehribach,
which was decided by the Seventh Circuit on July 17, 2007. 86 The
alleged claims of negligence and breach of contract were governed by
Indiana’s Accountancy Act of 2001. 87 The Seventh Circuit classified
the trustee’s theory of damages in the case as one based on the
controversial “deepening insolvency” theory. 88 While recognizing that
the theory of deepening insolvency could be invoked in certain
79

Id. Taurus’s Chief Financial Officer, Lisa Corry (who was also the daughter
of one of Taurus’s owners) was convicted of fraud and sentenced to prison. Id. at
908 (citing United States v. Corry, 206 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2000).
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 907.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 905.
87
Id. at 907.
88
Id. at 908.
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cases—such as in a case where the management worked with the
outsider to conceal the corporation’s decrepit financial status—the
court noted that it did not make sense to hold a third party liable under
the theory when the third party invested in the firm to keep it going
and the investment was misused by management. 89
The court also reconciled this case with its recognition of the
deepening insolvency damages theory in its earlier decision in Schacht
v. Brown. 90 In that case, the court formulated the theory of deepening
insolvency based on the notion that an insolvent corporation’s
shareholders would be harmed through additional borrowing.91 “A
puzzling suggestion,” the court reasoned, “because by hypothesis a
company harmed by deepening insolvency was insolvent before the
borrowing spree, so what had the shareholders to lose?” 92 The court
did recognize that a corporation could be insolvent in the traditional
sense—as by being unable to pay its debts as they become due—but
could still be worth more liquidated than the total of its liabilities so as
to remain valuable to the shareholders—precisely the scenario the
court assumed possible in Schacht. 93
The court went on to say that Fehribach was different than other
cases that could provide for damages based on deepening insolvency,
because once Taurus became insolvent the owners lost their entire
investments. 94 Thus, there was nothing left for them to lose, and the
only people that could be harmed by prolonging the corporation’s life
were the creditors. 95 Under Indiana law, which follows the privity rule
of Ultramares, creditors without any contractual relationship to the
auditor—which was the case with Taurus’s creditors—cannot file suit
against the third party auditor. 96 The court recognized that Taurus
could sue Ernst & Young, because it was the corporation that had the
89

Id. at 908-9.
Id. at 908. See also Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir. 1983).
91
Fehribach, 493 F.3d at 908 (citing Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1350).
92
Id. at 908.
93
Id. (citing Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1348).
94
Id. at 909.
95
Id.
96
Id.
90
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contractual relationship with the auditor. 97 Realistically, the court
acknowledged that any suit brought by the bankrupt Taurus would in
effect be brought for the benefit of its creditors. However, rather than
expressly stating the trustee lacked standing, the court decided that the
trustee’s claim failed on the facts regardless of how the standing issue
was resolved. 98
The fact that Taurus survived for more than a year after the audit
provided by Ernst & Young was conducted was not central to the
resolution of the case. 99 Rather, the court categorized a going-concern
qualification as a prediction, which may have to include items in the
audit report that would result to foreseeable harm to the company if
omitted. 100 The point of an audit, the court noted, is for the auditing
firm to look at the corporation’s financials, which are provided by the
corporation, and make sure that they correspond to reality. 101 Ernst &
Young did not find any discrepancies between Taurus’s financials and
its actual financial state because no such discrepancies existed. 102 The
court commented that Ernst & Young did fail to include a warning
about the trends toward nationalization in the frozen food market but
also stated that predicting Taurus’s cash flow beyond its financial
statements was outside the purpose of the audit report. 103 The court
noted that “an auditor’s duty is not to give business advice; it is merely
to paint an accurate picture of the audited firm’s financial condition,
insofar as the condition is revealed by the company’s books and
inventory and other sources of an auditor’s opinion.” 104
The court did note that the auditor has a duty to follow accounting
standards; in other words, it must be alert to certain conditions that
would prevent the company from continuing as a going concern when
considered in the aggregate. 105 These conditions include: negative
97

Id.
Id.
99
Id. at 910.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 910-11.
98

75
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trends, other indications of financial difficulties (defaults on loan
agreements, restructuring of debt, need to seek new sources of
financing, etc), internal matters such as work stoppages and other
labor difficulties, and external matters that have occurred such as legal
proceedings or loss of a key franchise. 106 However, “nowhere is the
auditor required to investigate external matters, as distinct from
discovering them during the engagement.” 107 Therefore, the court
focused on the fact that Ernst & Young was not hired to assess the
projected supply and demand for the industry, and it was impossible
for Ernst & Young to know more about trends in the frozen food
market than Taurus did itself. 108 Relying on those facts, the court held
that Ernst & Young was not liable to Taurus’s creditors for the losses
the company suffered from the prolonged liquidation. 109
The court went on to note that not only was it possible to find for
Ernst & Young on the merits, but the trustee’s claim was also barred
by the one year statute of limitations in the Accountancy Act. 110 Judge
Rovner concurred in the opinion, stating that she would have limited
the decision to whether the action was brought within the statute of
limitations and would have barred the action on that issue alone. 111
B. The HA2003 Liquidating Trust v. Credit Suisse Securities (USA)
LLC
The HA2003 Liquidating Trust v. Credit Suisse Securities (USA)
LLC involved a trust’s attempt to collect—for the sake of creditors—
from the debtor’s investment banker, Credit Suisse First Boston (now
Credit Suisse Securities) (“Credit Suisse”). 112 HA-LO Industries
(“HA-LO”) manufactured and sold promotional products bearing

106

Id. at 911.
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 911-12.
111
Id. at 913.
112
517 F.3d 454 (7th Cir. 2008).
107

76
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company logos for employees and advertising purposes. 113 In the
1990s, HA-LO considered expanding its business into the e-commerce
realm instead of focusing solely on traditional sales methods. 114 In
1999, John Kelley, HA-LO’s Chief Executive Officer decided that
purchasing Starbelly.com, Inc. (“Starbelly”) was the most promising
method of breaking into the e-commerce arena. 115 Starbelly was a
start-up company that was eating through its venture capital at a rate of
$3 million per month and had yet to make a sale. 116 Obviously, the
proposition was risky, but Kelley had faith in Starbelly’s e-commerce
system. 117
HA-LO enlisted the help of Credit Suisse as an investment banker
and Ernst & Young as a business consultant in connection with its
anticipated acquisition of Starbelly. 118 Along with renegotiating the
price of the sale and working out a pay structure to avoid placing HALO in violation of its loan covenants, Credit Suisse also issued a
fairness opinion representing that as of the date of the opinion
(January 17, 2000), “the Merger Consideration is fair to HA-LO from
a financial point of view.” 119 The fairness opinion issued by Credit
Suisse and its engagement letter with HA-LO both specified that it had
relied on—but not verified—HA-LO’s financial projections. 120
Verification of the financial projections was left up to Ernst & Young,
which informed Kelley that Starbelly would not generate nearly the

113

Id. at 455.
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 455-56. Fairness opinions can be issued in a number of significant
corporate transactions and are most often issued to a company’s board of directors
when that company is selling itself or acquiring another company. Tariq Mundiya,
Fairness Opinions: Courts Scrutinize the Role of Investment Banks, 5/29/2008
N.Y.L.J. 5, (col. 1) (2008).
120
HA2003 Liquidating Trust, 517 F.3d at 456.
114
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amount of revenue he had projected. 121 Kelley, however, refused to
accept the more realistic projections provided by Ernst & Young. 122
In April of 2000, HA-LO sent its shareholders a proxy
solicitation, which included the fairness opinion issued by Credit
Suisse. HA-LO’s investors approved the merger, and the deal was
closed in May 2000. 123 Shortly thereafter, HA-LO entered a
tumultuous financial period triggered both by the large cash payout to
Starbelly and Starbelly’s continuing losses. 124 In January 2001, HALO entered bankruptcy. 125 After HA-LO reorganized, a successor
emerged, as well as a liquidating trust. 126 The trust, known as
HA2003 Liquidating Trust, was set up to collect from anyone
associated with HA-LO’s failed transactions and to distribute the
proceeds to HA-LO’s pre-bankruptcy creditors. 127 The trust filed a
complaint against Credit Suisse alleging the investment banker was
grossly negligent in preparing its fairness opinion. 128 After a bench
trial in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the
court found that Credit Suisse was not grossly negligent in preparing
its fairness opinion; the trust appealed to the Seventh Circuit. 129
The case was decided on February 20, 2008 with an opinion
issued by Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook. 130 The court noted that the
district court had found that it could not label the investment bank’s
behavior grossly negligent because it was only doing what its contract
with HA-LO required it to do. 131 The district court also found that
HA-LO’s Chief Executive Officer and board members knew
121

Id.
Id.
123
Id.; A proxy solicitation is defined as a “request that a corporate shareholder
authorize another person to cast the shareholder’s vote at a corporate meeting.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
124
HA2003 Liquidating Trust, 517 F.3d at 456.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 455.
131
Id. at 456.
122
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everything they accused Credit Suisse of ignoring, which would make
assessing damages impossible. 132 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit
reviewed these factual findings using a clearly erroneous standard,
which the court concluded was not met. 133
Although the trust urged the court to consider whether fairness
opinions were just “worthless (but expensive) paper,” the court refused
to be pulled into the debate, finding that the question had no bearing
on the outcome of the case. 134 The court did state that requiring
investment banks to treat fairness opinions as insurance would only
raise the price of these decisions, thereby having a detrimental effect
on the market. 135 Such insurance, the court reasoned, would be
cheaper when achieved through the stock market and the ability of
investors to diversify their holdings. 136 The Seventh Circuit is known
for seizing the opportunity to promote the free market in its decisions,
and its line of rationale discussing the “efficient market” in The
HA2003 Liquidating Trust does not differ in that regard. 137
While the court took the chance to discuss market principles, its
decision to not hold Credit Suisse liable primarily relied on the fact
that the financial adviser not only acted according to normal business
standards but, more importantly, had performed its contract with HALO to the letter. 138 Credit Suisse relied on the numbers provided by
HA-LO in formulating its fairness opinion, and though those numbers
may have been wrong, Credit Suisse did not have the duty to ensure
their accuracy. 139 That task was left up to (and completed by) Ernst &
Young. 140 It was HA-LO’s choice to not provide Credit Suisse with
132

Id. at 456-57.
Id. at 457. The clearly erroneous standard requires that a reviewing judge
have a “definite and firm conviction” that an error was committed. Dickinson v.
Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999).
134
HA2003 Liquidating Trust, 517 F.3d at 457.
135
Id. at 458.
136
Id.
137
Dominic J. Campisi, Representing Estate and Trust Beneficiaries and
Fiduciaries, SP004 ALI-ABA 1, 10-11 (2008).
138
HA2003 Liquidating Trust, 517 F.3d at 457.
139
Id.
140
Id.
133
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those numbers but instead to ask the investment bank to tender the
fairness opinion using numbers generated by HA-LO itself. 141
The trust also argued that Credit Suisse should have foreseen the
end of the dot-com boom, an argument the court deemed an “appeal to
hindsight.” 142 The court went on to say that if everyone knew the dotcom boom was ending, as the trust asserted, then Credit Suisse had no
duty to revise its opinion as the trust argued it should have done. 143
Not only would have it been unnecessary to restate what the investing
public could clearly see, but Credit Suisse was hired to deliver an
opinion as of one date, which is exactly what it did. 144 Finally, the
trust asked the court to throw out the contract between the parties and
impose a separate set of duties on Credit Suisse. 145 The court refused
to do so, citing the principle that, “[i]ntelligent adults can enforce their
own standards of performance, and courts must enforce the deal they
have struck.” 146
The Seventh Circuit, therefore, reached the same general
conclusion as in Fehribach—that the third party professional was not
liable—by tailoring its focus to the contract between the parties as that
contract was written. 147
C. Joyce v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc.
In the last of the trilogy of cases, Joyce v. Morgan Stanley & Co.,
Inc., the shareholders and option holders brought suit against the
business’s financial advisor for constructive fraud stemming from the
advisor’s failure to address ways to hedge their risks. 148 Edward T.
141

Id.
Id. at 458.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id. at 459.
148
538 F.3d 797 (7th Cir. 2008). Hedging entails the “use of two compensating
or offsetting transactions to ensure a position of breaking even; to make advance
arrangements to safeguard oneself from loss on an investment, speculation, or bet.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
142

80
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Joyce and the other plaintiffs were shareholders and option holders in
21st Century Telecom Group (“21st Century”). 149 On December 12,
1999, 21st century entered into a merger agreement with RCN
Corporation (“RCN”) whereby RCN would acquire all of 21st
Century’s common stock. 150 Morgan Stanley advised 21st Century in
connection with the merger. 151 Unfortunately for the shareholders,
between the date of the merger agreement and the effective date of the
merger in April of 2000 RCN’s stock value plummeted. 152 The newly
acquired stock ended up worthless. 153
The shareholders filed suit against Morgan Stanley alleging
constructive fraud on the part of the financial advisor. 154 This fraud,
the shareholders claimed, stemmed from Morgan Stanley’s failure to
advise them how to minimize their exposure to any potential decline in
the value of the RCN stock. 155 Morgan Stanley filed a motion to
dismiss based on an alleged lack of standing, failure to state a claim,
and failure to sue within the statutory limitation period, which the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted. 156 The
shareholders appealed to the Seventh Circuit. 157
Judge Diane P. Wood issued the court’s opinion in Joyce, which
was decided on August 19, 2008. 158 The decision held that debtor’s
financial advisor, Morgan Stanley, could not be held liable to 21st
Century’s stockholders and option holders under a constructive fraud
theory. 159 The court began by stating that the shareholders did have
149

Joyce, 538 F.3d at 799.
Id. Common stock is “a class of stock entitling the holder to vote on
corporate matters, to receive dividends after other claims and dividends have been
paid (esp. to preferred shareholders), and to share in assets upon liquidation.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
151
Joyce, 538 F.3d at 799.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
Id. at 800.
155
Id. at 799.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Id. at 799.
159
Id. at 802.
150
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standing to bring the suit because their claims were direct rather than
derivative. 160 The shareholders alleged that their losses were based on
a failure to hedge rather than a drop in stock prices. 161 21st Century as
a corporation did not suffer any loss related to the lack of hedging
advice because 21st Century did not receive any RCN stock in the
transaction. 162 The court stated that while it was willing to
acknowledge that the shareholders had standing to bring the action, the
real issue turned on whether Morgan Stanley had a duty to give
hedging advice. 163
Considering the issue of whether Morgan Stanley had a duty to
give hedging advice was imperative to the resolution of the
shareholders’ constructive fraud claims. 164 Constructive fraud differs
from actual fraud in that it does not require actual dishonesty or the
intent to deceive; rather, the law imposes liability simply because of
the act’s tendency to deceive. 165 The claim of constructive fraud
requires either a confidential or a fiduciary relationship between the
parties. 166 In their complaint, the shareholders asserted that they had a
confidential relationship with Morgan Stanley, and that Morgan
Stanley did in fact owe them a fiduciary duty. 167 The shareholders
alleged that the fairness opinion provided by Morgan Stanley
constituted a breach of that fiduciary duty because it was not based on
an independent investigation, it failed to address the risks associated
with the transactions, and it did not identify the ways the shareholders
could hedge those risks to minimize losses. 168

160

Id. at 799-800. A direct claim may be brought when the shareholder suffers
a harm that is separate and distinct from the harm suffered by the corporation. The
claim is derivate when the harm to the shareholder is shared by the corporation. 18
C.J.S. Corporations §485 (2008).
161
Joyce, 538 F.3d at 800.
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
Id. at 801.
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The shareholders also alleged a conflict of interest based on the
fiduciary duty they claimed Morgan Stanley owed them. 169 This
conflict, the shareholders claimed, arose from the fact that Morgan
Stanley had previously advised RCN in connection with the merger—a
fact that was disclosed to the shareholders in Morgan Stanley’s
engagement letter. 170 Finally, rather than ask the court to find that the
alleged breach of duty lie in the fairness opinion, the shareholders
asked the court to look beyond the terms of that opinion (and beyond
what was alleged in their complaint) to find that Morgan Stanley owed
them an extra-contractual duty to provide advice relating to hedging
strategies. 171 The extra-contractual duty, the shareholders contended,
arose out of the special circumstances surrounding the relationship
between the parties. 172
The court rejected each of the above arguments made by the
shareholders. 173 First, the court acknowledged that 21st Century was
willing to engage Morgan Stanley despite the fact that it knew the firm
had previously advised RCN. 174 This willingness, the court suggested,
actually indicated that 21st Century was hoping a breach of fiduciary
duty by Morgan Stanley would cut in its favor—as 21st admitted it
hired the firm even though it knew Morgan Stanley had a substantial
amount of knowledge concerning RCN’s business and capital
structure. 175 The court determined, however, that 21st Century’s
motivations for engaging RCN were irrelevant, as the allegations that
Morgan Stanley breached its duty to the shareholders were the focus of
the case. 176
In determining whether a breach of duty occurred, the court
reasoned that even if it chose to overlook the fact that this extra169

Id.
Id. Morgan Stanley discontinued providing services to RCN when it began
advising 21st Century in connection with the proposed merger. Id.
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
Id. at 801-02.
174
Id. at 801.
175
Id.
176
Id.
170
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contractual duty was not pleaded in the complaint, the shareholders
could not show that special circumstances existed that would give rise
to that duty. 177 One necessary circumstance is that the allegedly
superior party must have accepted the duty to protect the interests of
the dependent party. 178 The court noted that no such evidence existed
to suggest that Morgan Stanley accepted this duty on behalf of the
shareholders. 179 In fact, Morgan Stanley’s engagement letter specified
that the advisor was working only for the corporation. 180 The court
compared this case to The HA2003 Liquidating Trust because
“[wishing] that a different contract had been written is not a basis for
liability.” 181
Finally, the court noted that it could have also upheld the district
court’s judgment based on the shareholder’s failure to sue within the
statutory limitations period. 182 The shareholders should have been put
on notice that they needed to investigate whether they were wrongfully
deprived of the means needed to prevent their losses on the effective
date of the merger agreement. 183 Investigating whether hedging
strategies were available would have taken little effort on the
shareholders part, and because the standard for knowledge is objective
rather than subjective, the shareholders could not claim that the statute
of limitations period was triggered at the moment they learned of the
availability of hedging strategies rather than the moment they learned
they had experienced a loss. 184

177

Id. at 802.
Id.
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
Id. at 803.
183
Id.
184
Id.
178
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IV. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT: HEADED IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION BUT IN
NEED OF A STRAIGHTER PATH
A. Fehribach, The HA2003 Liquidating Trust, and Joyce Were
Correctly Decided
The Seventh Circuit’s recent decisions in Fehribach, The
HA2003 Liquidating Trust, and Joyce are a step in the right direction
when applied to the question of how far to extend liability for a
debtor’s pre-bankruptcy professionals. This trilogy indicates that the
Seventh Circuit is reluctant, or even unwilling, to extend liability to
these professionals absent any specific misconduct on their part. 185
These decisions were careful not to shut out the possibility for
professional liability based on a standing issue alone—such as whether
there was privity of contract or a duty owed by the professional to a
third party. 186 Failing to consider the merits of these cases and
disposing them on a lack of standing alone would have been
nonsensical. As the court noted in Fehribach, Taurus, the bankrupt
company, obviously had standing to sue its pre-bankruptcy
professionals because of the contractual relationship it shared with
those professionals. 187 If Taurus would have been solvent at the time it
was injured by the auditing firm’s alleged negligence any suit brought
against the auditor would have been brought for the benefit of its
shareholders—even though the shareholders themselves could not
have sued the auditor. 188 The court went on to state that while it was
true that Ernst & Young had no duty to Taurus’s creditors, it did have a
duty to Taurus—a duty that did not evaporate because Taurus was
bankrupt, and it was its creditors who would receive the benefit from a
185

See Fehribach v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 493 F.3d 905 (7th Cir.
2007)(Rovner, J., concurring); HA2003 Liquidating Trust v. Credit Suisse Securities
(USA) LLC, 517 F.3d 454 (7th Cir. 2008); Joyce v. Morgan Stanley & Co.,,538 F.3d
797 (7th Cir. 2008).
186
See Fehribach, 493 F.3d at 909 (“The trustee’s claim fails nevertheless, but
fails on the facts”).
187
Id. at 909.
188
Id.
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successful suit. 189 By this rationale, the court’s decision to not dispose
of any of the aforementioned cases on lack of standing alone was the
logical approach. Also, it should be noted that in Fehribach the court
was dealing with the strict privity rule espoused by Ultramares, yet it
still chose to reach a decision on the merits. 190
Although Fehribach, The HA2003 Liquidating Trust, and Joyce
were decided on the merits, two of these cases—Fehribach and
Joyce—could have been resolved by simply holding that the suits were
not brought within the statutory limitations period. 191 The fact that the
court decided to discuss the merits of each of these cases before
holding that the actions were also barred by the statute of limitations
indicates that the court wanted to use these cases to espouse its general
views regarding the extension of liability to outside professionals. In
doing so, the court acknowledged its unwillingness to hold
professionals liable for actions that were not required by their
engagement letters—without shutting out the possibility that such an
action could exist. 192 The court, however, could have devised an
analytical framework that would have made its inquiries into the facts
of each case much simpler.
B. The Three Prong Test for Equitable Subordination as a Guideline
for Devising an Efficient Analytical Framework for Professional
Liability Claims
It is possible to formulate an initial analytical framework for
determining whether these professionals can be held liable for the
services they rendered to a debtor pre-bankruptcy—whether the suit is
189

Id.
Id.
191
493 F.3d at 911; 538 F.3d at 803.
192
Compare HA2003 Liquidating Trust, 517 F.3d 454, 458 (7th Cir. 2008)
(“The engagement contract says CSFB has no duty to double-check the
predictions. . .CSFB did what it was hired to do), with Fehribach, 493 F.3d at 910
(“The requirement that the auditor disclose in its report any substantial doubt it has
that the firm will still be a going concern in a year expands the auditor’s duty beyond
that of verifying the accuracy of the company’s financial statements”).
190
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brought under a fraud, negligence, or deepening insolvency damages
theory. Furthermore, the rule utilized should be similar to a rule
applied in a different context—to the question of whether a lender’s
claim can be equitably subordinated. 193 In considering whether a claim
can be equitably subordinated, the Seventh Circuit —as well as other
circuits—follows a three-prong balancing test that considers whether:
“(1) the claimant creditor has engaged in some sort of inequitable
misconduct; (2) the misconduct has resulted in an injury to other
creditors or an unfair advantage to the miscreant; and (3)
subordination of the debt is inconsistent with the other provisions of
the bankruptcy code.” 194
While some courts have held that inequitable conduct is not
required for subordination, such conduct is a requirement when
attempting to subordinate the claims of a secured lender. 195 Generally,
financial lending institutions do not owe a duty to their borrowers;
however, an exception to this rule exists when the lending institution
exerts “dominion or control” over the debtor. 196 A close relationship
between the lender and the debtor is not considered sufficient; the
lender must exercise enough control over the debtor to both influence
corporate policy and the disposition of assets. 197 Thus, a lender’s claim
will not be equitably subordinated unless it is proven that the lender
actually controlled the debtor. 198
Applying the aforementioned rule as an initial step to determining
the potential liability of a debtor’s pre-bankruptcy professionals would
193

Equitable subordination represents the power of the bankruptcy court under
§ 510(c) of the Bankruptcy Code to reprioritize claims in a bankruptcy case if the
court determines the claimant has engaged in misconduct that either injures other
creditors or confers on unfair advantage on the claimant. In re Kreisler, 2008 WL
4613880 *864, *866 (7th Cir.). See also 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (2008).
194
Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. Citicorp North America (In
re Aluminum Mills Corp.), 132 B.R. 869, 893 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (citing the three prong
balancing test of In re Mobile Steel Co., 563 F.2d 692, 702 (5th Cir. 1977).
195
Aluminum Mills, 132 B.R. at 893.
196
Id. at 894.
197
Id.
198
See id.
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establish a bright line rule for creditor’s claiming they were owed
duties outside of the scope of what was required in their engagement
letters—professionals will not be liable for the alleged negligence
unless they exercised control over the debtor that amounted to a
dictatorship over corporate policy. 199 This test would be easier to
apply than and would eliminate the need for the court’s current
approach of looking at each case on a fact by fact basis to determine
liability for whether fairness opinions should have amended, or market
trends and other external factors should have been considered, or
numbers should have been verified. The test would also create a
balance by ensuring that outside professionals are held accountable for
their actions when exerting control over the debtor—a balance that
will not be achieved by simply inquiring into whether an engagement
letter required a specific action.
As further support, the proposed test falls squarely in line with the
Seventh Circuit’s reasoning against finding lender liability in the
context of equitable subordination. For example, in Kham & Nate’s
Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, the court noted the general
lack of cases subordinating the claims of creditors that dealt only at
arm’s length with the debtor. 200 The debtor in Kham urged the court to
find that the lender’s conduct could be inequitable even though the
lender had complied with all of its contractual obligations.201 The
court rejected this argument, stating they were “not willing to embrace
a rule that requires participants in commercial transactions not only to
keep their contracts but also do ‘more’—just how much more resting
in the discretion of a bankruptcy judge assessing the situation years
later.” 202 Surely, the rule proposed in this Article would take any
discretion out of the hands of a bankruptcy judge as to whether a
professional without control over the debtor was required to do
199

Of course, if the alleged negligence or breach lies within the performance of
duties required by the professional’s engagement letter then the claims should be
analyzed in accordance with the elements of standard tort and contract claims.
200
908 F.2d 1351, 1356 (7th Cir. 1990).
201
Id.
202
Id.
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“more”—an outcome that would seem welcomed by the Seventh
Circuit.
CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit rightfully concluded that an outside
professional was not liable for the bankruptcy or financial loss of the
company it advised in Fehribach, The HA2003 Liquidating Trust, and
Joyce. The plaintiffs in each of these cases were only seeking, as Chief
Judge Easterbrook put it, “a deep pocket to reimburse investors for the
costs of managers’ blunders.” 203 These plaintiffs brought suit against
the professionals based on claims for breach of contract, negligence,
constructive fraud, and under the deepening insolvency damages
theory—all common theories of liability that professionals are sued
under throughout other circuit and lower federal courts. The Seventh
Circuit did not expressly state that the third party plaintiffs lacked
standing to bring any of the claims; rather, the court decided each case
on the merits. In doing so, the court rejected each claim brought
against the professionals in all three cases on a fact by fact basis.
The court’s failure to outline a general analytical framework in
any of its decisions, however, will surely lead to the exercise of
judicial direction as to whether these professionals can be held liable.
A clear rule is necessary to simplify the liability question for these
professionals in the Seventh Circuit as well as in the other circuit
courts and lower federal courts. The imperativeness of such a rule is
especially apparent in the current economic climate—where
management in a number of industries has been blamed for their
respective industry’s collapse or potential collapse. 204 If these
203

HA2003 Liquidating Trust v. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, 517 F.3d
454, 457 (7th Cir. 2008).
204
See Mitt Romney, Let Detroit Go Bankrupt , NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 19,
2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/19/opinion/19romney.html?_r=1 (“don’t ask
Washington to give shareholders, , .a free pass—they bet on management and they
lost”); Julie Hirschfield Davis, Lehman’s Golden Parachutes Were Being Secured
While Execs Were Pleading for Federal Rescue, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 6,
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industries do fail, there is always the possibility that their creditors will
go after the outside professional advisors as a means of recovery. A
clear cut rule delineating when these advisors can be held liable would
eliminate the need for the federal courts to examine each case on a fact
by fact basis to determine what actions, if any, the advisor could have
taken on behalf of the struggling business and whether they were
actually obligated to take those actions irrespective of whether their
engagement letters required it.
The rule used for determining when these professionals can be
held liable should be similar to the rule applied to the question of
whether a secured lender’s claim can be equitably subordinated. In
other words, plaintiffs alleging that a professional should have done
more to warn them about the financial condition of the business the
professional advised should first be required to prove that the
professional exercised control over the debtor. Such a rule would not
only ensure that professionals performing their contractual duties to
the letter would not be held liable by third parties seeking a deep
pocket, but it would also balance the detrimental effects of holding
that a professional is not liable for actions not required by their
engagement letter when that professional was exercising actual control
over the debtor.

2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/10/06/lehmans-goldenparachutes_n_132258.html (“culture of entitlement” among Lehman management);
Peter Whoriskey, AIG Spa Trip Fuels Fury on Hill, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 8,
2008, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/10/07/AR2008100702604_pf.html (a week before former
AIG CEO told investors company was confident in their valuation methods,
Pricewaterhouse Coopers, AIG’s auditor, had warned them that they could have a
material weakness in that area).
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